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Abstract
This Article examines the validity of the Commission’s position on the private enforceability
of commitment decisions in national courts in the European Union in light of the current state of
European law and other important procedural and practical considerations for third parties wish-
ing to bring enforcement proceedings. As will become apparent, national courts faced with an
application for private enforcement will have to grapple with a series of challenging legal issues
concerning the nature of commitment decisions. The first of these questions will concern whether
a commitment decision, which is a Community measure, will be capable of enforcement by ap-
plication of the concept of direct effect of Community law. Our examination of the principles of
direct effect indicates, however, that reliance on this concept may cause difficulties for national
courts. Secondly, the principle of national procedural autonomy requires that enforcement pro-
ceedings will be governed by the procedural rules of the national court seized of the action. Even
if commitment decisions are directly effective, there may consequently be substantial impediments
to their effective private enforcement due to the national rules of procedure in the Member States.
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INTRODUCTION
Article 9 of Council Regulation 1/2003 ("Regulation 1")1
brings about an important development in the enforcement of
European Community ("EC" or "Community") competition law
by introducing an entirely new type of European Commission
("Commission") decision. It enables the Commission, for the
first time, to settle investigations formally by decision and to ac-
cept commitments to meet its competition concerns without
coming to an infringement finding (a "commitment decision").2
Regulation 1 also brings about some fundamental changes
* John Davies is a partner and Manish Das is an associate in the Antitrust, Compe-
tition and Trade Group at Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer; both are solicitors of the
Supreme Court of England and Wales. The authors are grateful for the observations
and comments of their colleagues Margaret Bloom, Alison Jones, and Daniel Harrison.
The views expressed are personal.
1. Council Regulation 1/2003, O.J. L 1/1 (2002) (implementing the rules of com-
petition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Com-
munity ("EC Treaty")). Council Regulation 1/2003 ("Regulation 1") is the culmination
of a five-year review by the European Commission ("Commission") on the reform of
Regulation 17/62, which was the first regulation implementing EC Treaty Articles 81
and 82. The review formally began in 1999 with the Commission's White Paper on
Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty ("White
Paper"), which was essentially a consultation document setting out the Commission's
initial thinking and proposals for reform. See Commission of the European Communi-
ties, White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of
the EC Treaty, COM (99) 101 Final (Apr. 1999) [hereinafter White Paper], available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/off/white/indexen.htm. This was followed by the Com-
mission's proposal for a Council Regulation on the implementation of the rules on
competition to replace Council Regulation 17/62. See Commission of the European
Communities, Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Implementation of the Rules
on Competition Laid Down by Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and Amending Regula-
tions (EEC) No. 1017/68, (EEC) No. 2988/74, (EEC) No. 4056/86 and (EEC) No.
3975/87, COM (2000) 582 Final (Sept. 2000) [hereinafter Proposal], available at http:/
/europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2000/com2000_O582enl.pdf.
2. See Council Regulation 1/2003, O.J. L 1/1 (2002).
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to the enforcement of competition law. It facilitates decentrali-
zation in enforcement and encourages private enforcement, 3
both of which are designed to enable the Commission to take on
the challenges brought about by a better integrated market and
enlargement.
Although the Commission is given full power to enforce
commitments given to it under Article 9 by means of imposing
potentially substantial fines,4 the Commission has stated in its
memo answering frequently asked questions that "national
courts must enforce the commitments by any means provided
for by national law, including the adoption of interim mea-
sures."5 Further, in its notice on cooperation with national
courts, the Commission has stated that, "[n]ational courts may
thus have to enforce Commission decisions or regulations apply-
ing [Article 81(3) of the Treaty Establishing the European Com-
munity ("EC Treaty" or "Treaty")] to certain categories of agree-
ments, decisions or concerted practices."6 In endnote fifteen of
3. See, e.g., id., arts. 3, 5, 6, 11, 12, 15, 16, 22, 35, O.J. L 1/1, at 8-13, 16, 21-22
(2002); see also id. at recitals 6, 7, 8, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 28, 35, O.J. L 1/1, at 2, 4-7
(2002). These articles and recitals in Regulation 1 envisage and require both national
competition authorities and national courts to apply EC Treaty Articles 81 and 82
where they apply equivalent national competition laws. They also contemplate enforce-
ment of competition laws by private parties in the national courts. See, e.g., Donncadh
Woods et al., Private Enforcement of Community Competition Law: Modernisation and the
Road Ahead, COMPETITION POL'Y NEWSL., Summer 2004, at 31, available at http://europa.
eu.int/comm/competition/publications/cpn/cpn2004_2.pdf; C line Gauer et al., Reg-
ulation 1/2003: A Modernised Application of EC Competition Rules, COMPETITION POL'Y
NEWSL., Spring 2003, at 3, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/publi-
cations/cpn/cpn2003_l.pdf; Mario Monti, Former European Comm'r for Competition
Matters, Address at the International Bar Association's 8th Annual Competition Confer-
ence: Private Litigation as a Key Complement to Public Enforcement of Competition
Rules and the First Conclusions on the Implementation of the New Merger Regulation
(Sept. 17, 2004), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?refer-
ence=SPEECH/04/403&format=PDF&aged=l&language=EN&guiLanguage=EN.
4. See Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 23(2) (c), O.J. L 1/1, at 16 (2002) (giving
the Commission the power to impose fines on undertakings (up to ten perceit of their
worldwide turnover) for failure to comply with a commitment decision); see also id. art.
24(1)(c), O.J. L 1/1, at 17-18 (2002) (giving the Commission the power to impose
periodic penalties in order to ensure an undertaking's compliance with commitments).
5. Press Release, European Commission, Commitment Decisions (Article 9 of
Council Regulation 1/2003 Providing for a Modernised Framework for Antitrust Scru-
tiny of Company Behaviour), MEMO/04/217 (Sept. 17, 2004), available at http://eu-
ropa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/04/217&format=HTML
&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=EN.
6. Commission Notice, O.J. C 101/54, at 55, 7 (2004) [hereinafter Cooperation]
(concerning the cooperation between the Commission and the courts of the [Euro-
pean Union ("EU")] Member States in the application of EC Treaty Articles 81 and 82).
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the notice, the Commission clarifies that "a national court may
be asked to enforce a Commission decision taken pursuant to
Articles 7 to 10, 23 and 24" of Regulation 1.7 These statements
confirm the Commission's desire to see the policies of decentral-
ization and private enforcement shape the enforcement of com-
petition law in the Community by requiring not only the full and
direct application of Community competition laws in the Mem-
ber States by private parties on their own initiative, but also sup-
plementary enforcement where the Commission has already
taken primary enforcement action by adopting a commitment
decision under Regulation 1.
Representatives of the Commission have also unofficially
supported this position, giving the impression that the Commis-
sion wants to downplay its ability to enforce its commitment deci-
sions directly by means of fines,' stating that:
It is indeed highly desirable that commitments can be moni-
tored and enforced by the market participants themselves.
The main purpose of Article 9 is to ensure efficiency of en-
forcement action by the Commission. If the case comes back
to us for enforcing the commitments, this aim would be not
be achieved.'
This is a significant departure from the Commission's enforce-
ment practice under Regulation 17/62, where the Commission
was well known for seeking to enforce its own decisions by utiliz-
ing its fining powers. 10
Interestingly, Regulation 1 is itself silent on the private en-
7. Id. O.J. C 101/54, at 61 n.15 (2004).
8. See, e.g., Wouter P.J. Wils, The Modernisation of the Enforcement of Articles 81 and 82
EC: A Legal and Economic Analysis of the Commission's Proposal for a New Council Regulation
Replacing Regulation No. 17, 24 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1655 (2001); Gauer et al., supra note 3,
at 6; Stefan Wilbert, Joint Selling of Bundesliga Media Rights-First Commission Decision Pur-
suant to Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, COMPETITION POL'Y NEWSL., Summer 2005, at 44.
9. David Samuels, Q&A on Modernisation, with Kris Dekeyser, GLOBAL COMPETITION
REv., Spring 2005, at 11 (2005).
10. In past cases, the Commission has stated that a periodic penalty would be im-
posed on all the undertakings concerned if they did not bring to an end their infringe-
ments of competition laws within three months of the Commission's infringement deci-
sion. See, e.g., Commission Decision No. 82/367/EEC, O.J. L 161/18, at 33, 82 (1982)
(Hasselblad). Similarly, when imposing interim measures, the Commission also noti-
fied parties in its interim measures decision that periodic penalties would be imposed
to secure compliance. See, e.g., Commission Decision No. 82/462/EEC, Oj. L 252/13,
at 20, 38 (1983) (ECS/AKZO); Commission Decision No. 82/628/EEC, Oj. L 256/
20, at 28, 49 (1982) (Ford Werke); Commission Decision No. 87/500/EEC, O.J. L
286/36, at 42, 25 (1987) (BBI/Boosey and Hawkes).
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forceability of commitment decisions. This is surprising bearing
in mind that the Commission intended to enable private en-
forcement of its commitment decisions from the very inception
of Regulation 1.11 In its White Paper on Modernisation of the
Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty ("White
Paper"), the Commission noted that it would be useful to make
commitments offered by undertakings during the course of an
investigation binding, "both in order to oblige the undertakings
to comply with them and to enable the parties and others to rely
on them before their national courts."12 The Commission's Pro-
posal for a Council Regulation on the Implementation of the
Rules on Competition Laid Down by Articles 81 and 82 of the
Treaty and Amending Regulations (EEC) No 1017/68, (EEC)
No 2988/74, (EEC) No 4056/86 and (EEC) No 3975/87 ("Pro-
posal") 13 went further: The Explanatory Memorandum stated
that commitment decisions could be "invoked" by third parties
before their national courts' 4 and recital 12 of the draft Regula-
tion 1 provided that "commitments can be relied upon by third
parties before national courts. ' 15 The fact that these statements
did not survive to the final text of Regulation 1 as agreed by the
Member States suggests that they may not have completely
shared the Commission's view on private enforcement.
This Article examines the validity of the Commission's posi-
tion on the private enforceability of commitment decisions in
national courts in the European Union in light of the current
state of European law and other important procedural and prac-
tical considerations for third parties wishing to bring enforce-
ment proceedings. As will become apparent, national courts
faced with an application for private enforcement will have to
grapple with a series of challenging legal issues concerning the
nature of commitment decisions.
The first of these questions will concern whether a commit-
ment decision, which is a Community measure, 6 will be capable
11. See generally Council Regulation 1/2003, OJ. L 1/1 (2002).
12. White Paper, supra note 1, COM (99) 101 Final, at 32, 90.
13. Proposal, supra note 1, COM (2000) 582 Final. The Proposal included an Ex-
planatory Memorandum and an initial draft of Regulation 1. See id. at 2.
14. See id. at 18.
15. Id. at 34.
16. For the benefit of non-European Community ("EC" or "Community") lawyers,
it is worth clarifying that other Community measures or instruments include treaty pro-
visions, Community regulations, directives, and, of course, decisions. See Europa, Corn-
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of enforcement by application of the concept of direct effect of
Community law. 7 Our examination of the principles of direct
effect indicates, however, that reliance on this concept may
cause difficulties for national courts. Secondly, the principle of
national procedural autonomy requires that enforcement pro-
ceedings will be governed by the procedural rules of the national
court seized of the action. Even if commitment decisions are
directly effective, there may consequently be substantial impedi-
ments to their effective private enforcement due to the national
rules of procedure in the Member States.
I. THE RELEVANCE OF DIRECT EFFECT
The absence of any provision for the private enforcement of
commitment decisions in Regulation 1 is not decisive. The legal
effects of Commission decisions, including the scope for their
private enforceability, are not limited to the effects ascribed to
them in Community legislation; they may also be derived from
the terms of the Treaty and the case law of the Community
courts, the latter of which has been instrumental in creating
mechanisms to allow for the domestic application of Community
law. One such mechanism is that of "direct effect,"' 8 which has
often been called upon by individuals in domestic litigation to
enable them to rely on rights derived from Community law and
implementing Community instruments, such as regulations, di-
rectives, and decisions where the measure has not been imple-
mented into national legislation. 9 The doctrine of direct effect
was conceived in the European Court of Justice's ("ECJ") cele-
brated judgment in van Gend & Loos2° where the Court declared
that the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Commu-
munity Legal Instruments, http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/glossary/community-legal-
instrumentsen.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2005).
17. See Cooperation, supra note 6, O.J. C 101/54, at 55, 7 (2004) ("Apart from
the application of Articles 81 and 82 [of the EC Treaty], national courts are also compe-
tent to apply acts adopted by EU institutions in accordance with the EC Treaty or in
accordance with the measures adopted to give the Treaty effect, to the extent that these
acts have direct effect.").
18. The other notable mechanism is, of course, the principle of supremacy of EC
law. See, e.g., Costa v. E.N.E.L., Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585, [1964] C.M.L.R. 425.
19. See, e.g., Marshall v. Southampton & S.W. Hampshire Area Health Auth., Case
152/84, [1986] E.C.R. 723, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 688; Roberts v. Tate & Lyle Indus. Ltd.,
Case 151/84, [1986] E.C.R. 703, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 714.
20. NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v.
Neth. Inland Revenue Admin., Case 26/62, [1963] E.C.R. 1, [1963] C.M.L.R. 105.
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nity ("EEC Treaty") was much more than simply an agreement
among the Member States, because it created a "new legal or-
der," the result of which was that "[i] ndependently of the legisla-
tion of Member States, Community law not only imposes obliga-
tions on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them
rights which become part of their legal heritage. '21 The result
has been that even where Community measures have not been
implemented into national laws, they can, in certain circum-
stances, be relied upon by and applied in the dealings of individ-
uals under national law. 22 By referring to the concept of "direct
effect" in its notice on cooperation with national courts, the
Commission is clearly indicating that this mechanism will enable
its commitment decisions to be subject to private enforcement. 2
The application of the concept of direct effect is not
straightforward, however. There remains uncertainty over its
precise meaning, its scope, and also its applicability to any given
situation, which the Commission also appears to have acknowl-
edged in its notice on cooperation. 24
Since commitment decisions are creations of EC law, estab-
lishing that they are directly effective will be prerequisite to ena-
bling their national enforcement; otherwise, individuals will not
be able to rely on them in domestic proceedings. 25 Establishing
whether a Community instrument is directly effective is often
taken to mean ascertaining whether the particular provision of
the instrument in question is "unconditional and sufficiently
precise. '26 We address this issue below. 27 We believe, however,
that in the case of commitment decisions, this issue involves
three prior exercises. These require establishing that the com-
mitment decision: (a) is binding; (b) ought to be capable of
direct effect because it applies Community law; and (c) confers
the rights claimed by the individual. National courts may have
greater difficulty in dealing with some of the questions raised by
21. Id. at 2, 3, [1963] C.M.L.R. at 129.
22. See id. at 3, 5, [1963] C.M.L.R. at 130.
23. See Cooperation, supra note 6, O.J. C 101/54, at 55, 7 (2004).
24. See id. The Commission's reference to direct effect is qualified by the inclusion
of the phrase "to the extent that these acts have" prior to its reference to "direct effect."
Id.
25. See van Gend & Loos, [1963] E.C.R. at 2, 3, [1963] C.M.L.R. at 129.
26. See Pfeiffer v. Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Waldshut eV, Joined Cases
C-397/01 & C-403/01, [2004] E.C.R. 1-8835, 103, [2005] 1 C.M.L.R. 1123, 1177-78.
27. See infra Part II.D.
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the latter two exercises than the Commission may have, at least
publicly, anticipated.
II. SHOULD COMMITMENT DECISIONS BE CAPABLE OF
DIRECT EFFECT?
At the outset of this analysis, we should remind ourselves
that, in seeking to answer this question, we cannot restrict our-
selves to the realm of competition law, as there is a great deal of
precedent in other areas of Community activity as to whether the
acts of Community institutions, including decisions of the Com-
mission in areas as diverse as export policies to taxation, are ca-
pable of direct effect.2"
The starting point for our analysis is Article 249 of the EC
Treaty, which states:
In order to carry out their task and in accordance with the
provisions of this Treaty, the European Parliament acting
jointly with the Council, the Council and the Commission
shall make regulations and issue directives, take decisions,
make recommendations or deliver opinions .... A decision
shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is ad-
dressed.29
Article 85 of the EC Treaty specifically entrusts the Commis-
sion with the task of ensuring the application of the provisions of
Articles 81 and 82.30 It is, therefore, clear that the Commission's
commitment decisions are binding on their addressees. 1 But
the issue of private enforcement raises a different question-
namely, whether an individual can rely on the binding effect of a
commitment decision under Community law so as to be able to
enforce it under domestic law against the party to whom it was
addressed. Article 249 of the EC Treaty does not answer this
28. The writers, who are competition lawyers, have embarked on this voyage with
some trepidation.
29. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art.
249, OJ. C 325/33, at 132 (2002), 37 I.L.M. 79, 128 [hereinafter Consolidated EC
Treaty].
30. See id. art. 85, OJ. C 325/33, at 66 (2002) ("Without prejudice to Article 84,
the Commission shall ensure the application of the principles laid down in Articles 81
and 82 [of the EC Treaty]."); see also id. art. 211, OJ. C 325/33, at 119 (2002) (stating
that the Commission shall "ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures
taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied").
31. See id.
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question. 2 As an opinion of Advocate General Carl Otto Lenz
in 1987 indicated, however, the question has already arisen, but
not yet been resolved:
The circumstances in which a decision of the Commission,
within the meaning of Article 189 of the EEC Treaty [now
Article 249 of the EC Treaty], has direct effect have not been
conclusively defined by the Court of Justice. Admittedly the
Court has not ruled out the possibility, in particular cases,
that decisions may have direct effect inasmuch as third parties
who have an interest in the implementation of a decision may
themselves be able to assert claims arising out of the decision.
However the detailed requirements which a decision must sat-
isfy in order for it to be recognised as having direct effect in
general terms have not yet been laid down by the Court in its
decisions."
Although a number of relevant judgments have been
handed down since this statement, the Community courts3 4
have, thus far, not been called upon, as far as the writers are
aware, to decide whether a Commission decision can be directly
effective and, therefore, capable of being relied upon by individ-
uals against the addressees of the decision.
These issues have, however, a somewhat longer history. The
first case considering the direct effect of Community decisions
was Grad 5 in 1970, where a German court asked the ECJ to de-
termine whether the provisions of a decision of the Council of
Ministers (addressed to Germany) could be relied upon by an
32. See id. art. 249, O.J. C 325/33, at 132 (2002).
33. Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Albako Margarinefabrik Maria von der
Linde GmbH & Co. KG v Bundesanstalt far landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung, Case
249/85, [1987] E.C.R. 2345, 183. In Albako, the referring West German court asked
the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") whether a Commission decision addressed to
West Germany enabling promotion sales of butter on the West Berlin market was di-
rectly effective so as to enable it to take precedence over national competition laws. See
id. at 2289. In doing so, the ECJ confirmed the holding of Franz Grad v. Finanzamt
Traunstein, Case 9/70, [1970] E.C.R. 825, [1971] C.M.L.R. 1, in which it had held that
a decision of the Council of Ministers was capable of direct effect, but also factually
distinguished that case by re-characterizing the appropriate question to answer as one
relating to the principle of supremacy of Community law. See Rau, [1987] E.C.R. at
2358, 10. The ECJ concluded in Rau that, pursuant to the principle of supremacy,
the Commission decision was to take precedence over conflicting national law. See id. at
2360, 17.
34. By Community courts, we refer to the ECJ and the Court of First Instance
("CFI-).
35. Grad, [1970] E.C.R. 825, [1971] C.M.L.R. 1.
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individual to avoid a tax assessment in accordance with the pre-
existing rules on transport taxes.3 6 In that case, the ECJ had lit-
tle hesitation in concluding that the Council decision was capa-
ble of direct effect, that it met the conditions for direct effect
and could be relied upon by the individual as claimed. 7 The
ECJ's reasoning was as follows:
In particular, the provision according to which Decisions are
binding in their entirety on those to whom they are addressed
enables the question to be put whether the obligation created
by the Decision can only be invoked by the Community insti-
tutions against the addressee or whether such a right may
possibly be exercised by all those who have an interest in the
fulfilment of this obligation. It would be incompatible with
the binding effect attributed to Decisions by Article 189 [now
EC Treaty Article 249] to exclude in principle the possibility
that persons affected may invoke the obligation imposed by a
Decision. Particularly in cases where, for example, the Com-
munity authorities by means of a Decision have imposed an
obligation on a Member State or all the Member States to act
in a certain way, the effectiveness ("l'effet utile") of such a
measure would be weakened if the nationals of that state
could not invoke it in the courts and the national courts
could not take it into consideration as part of Community
law.38
This clear statement of principle-which we note, applies
expressly to Council decisions only which are in the language of
the Court "particularly" susceptible to this approach-was then
qualified by the ECJ in the following terms:
Article 177 [now EC Treaty Article 234], whereby the national
courts are empowered to refer to the court all questions re-
garding the validity and interpretation of all acts of the insti-
tutions without distinction, also implies that individuals may
invoke such acts before the national courts. Therefore, in
each particular case, it must be ascertained whether the na-
ture, background and wording of the provision in question
are capable of producing direct effects in the legal relation-
ships between the addressee of the act and third parties.39
36. See id. at 827-28, [1971] C.M.L.R. at 3 (describing the facts of the case).
37. See id. at 841-42, 1-3, [1971] C.M.L.R. at 37-38.
38. Id. at 837, 5, [1971] C.M.L.R. at 33-34.
39. Id. at 837, 6, [1971] C.M.L.R. at 34.
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Even though the decision in question was a Council deci-
sion, the ECJ's rationale is framed in such general terms that it is
clearly arguable that it is capable of application to a Commission
decision and possibly a commitment decision. It is also clear,
however, that one must first confirm that commitment decisions
meet the various criteria that the Court set for direct effect.
There are three discernible strands to the ECJ's reasoning
that are relevant to the question of whether a decision has direct
effect. The first is the reliance placed by the ECJ on the binding
effect of a decision.4 ° The second is the ECJ's reliance on the
principle of effectiveness or "l'effet utile," which implicitly in-
cludes, as we shall see, an examination of the "nature" and the
"background" of the provision in question.4 1 The third stage re-
quires examining in any given case whether the "wording of the
provision in question are capable of producing direct effects in
the legal relationships between the addressee of the act and
third parties."42
It is worth noting that these considerations are quite sepa-
rate from assessing whether the decision, as mentioned earlier, is
"unconditional and sufficiently precise;" these conditions were
considered separately by the ECJ, at the very end of its analysis,
by reference to the precise wording of the decision in question.43
A. The Binding Nature of Commitment Decisions
There should be little doubt that a commitment decision
has a binding nature. First, the binding nature of Community
decisions is made plain from the terms of the EC Treaty, which
as explained above, provides in Article 249 that "[a] decision
shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is ad-
dressed."'  Article 9 of Regulation 1 makes this explicit in the
case of commitment decisions by providing that "the Commis-
sion may by decision make those commitments binding. 45
40. See id. at 837-38, 2-10, [1971] C.M.L.R. at 22-25 (addressing the binding
effect of a decision).
41. See id. at 839, 1 11-15, [1971] C.M.L.R. at 25 (addressing the principle of
effectiveness).
42. Id. at 837, 6, [1971] C.M.L.R. at 25-26. The ECJ subsequently clarified this
passage to mean whether the provision created a right for the individual. See id. at 838,
10, [1971] C.M.L.R. at 23.
43. See id. at 838, 9, [1971] C.M.L.R. at 35.
44. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 29, art. 249, O.J. C 325/33, at 132 (2002).
45. Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 9, Oj. L 1/1, at 9-10 (2002). Recital 13 of
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The Community courts have, on several occasions and in
varying circumstances, confirmed the binding effect of the Com-
mission's decisions. In the competition field, the Court of First
Instance ("CFI") recently noted in MCL,4 7 in relation to a Com-
mission decision under the Merger Regulation prohibiting a
concentration, that an undertaking is obliged to comply with a
Commission decision and that "[s]uch an obligation is inherent
in the very nature of decisions, as is apparent from the fourth
paragraph of [EC Treaty Article 249] .""
These confirmations by the Community courts are, of
course, relevant to the question of private enforceability. After
all, the essence of any private action seeking to enforce a com-
mitment decision will be to require the addressee to comply with
the terms of the commitment it agreed to.4 9 Moreover, by illus-
trating the Community courts' concern to ensure that the Com-
mission's decisions are not to be undermined, these statements
will also carry weight with national courts seized with a private
enforcement action.
B. The Principle of Effectiveness ("effet utile ")
Grad specifically identifies the well-established principle of
Regulation 1 echoes this provision by providing that the "the Commission should be
able to adopt decisions which make those commitments binding on the undertakings
concerned." Id. at recital 13, O.J. L 1/1, at 3 (2002).
46. In SpA Unil-It., for example, the ECJ confirmed the principle that a Commis-
sion decision compels the addressee to behave in the manner prescribed. See SpA Unil-
It. v. Amministrazione Finaziaria dello Stato, Case 30/75, [1975] E.C.R. 1419, 1425-28,
[1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 115, 126-29. In Deggendorf the court rejected an application by a
recipient of State aid to challenge a Commission decision addressed to Germany, the
State granting the aid, after the time limits for challenge had expired. See TWD Tex-
tilwerke Deggendorf GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Case C-188/92, [1994]
E.C.R. 1-833. The ECJ held that to allow a challenge would be to "overcome the defini-
tive nature which the decision assumes against that person" after the expiry of time
limits. Id. at 1-853, 18.
47. MCI, Inc. v. Commission, Case T-310/00, [2004] E.C.R. -, [2004] 5 C.M.L.R.
26.
48. Id. at 1290, 48. This statement was made in the context of identifying the
right of parties to challenge a Commission decision prohibiting a concentration not-
withstanding the fact that the parties had abandoned the merger. The CFI's conclusion
that the parties had the right to challenge the decision was founded in part on its
conclusion that compliance with the Commission's decision, by abandoning the con-
centration, was an obligation and, therefore, cannot be taken to be an indication that
the parties have no interest in bringing proceedings. See id. at 1275.
49. See van Gend & Loos, Case 26/62, [1963] E.C.R. 1, 13, [1963] C.M.L.R. 105,
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effectiveness ("effet utile") as one of the key justifications for find-
ing that decisions are capable of being directly effective. 50 This
principle derives from the purposive and teleological approach
to interpretation taken by the Community courts and ultimately
requires "the effective protection of Community rights, and
more generally, the effective enforcement of Community law in
national courts."'
The Court in Grad held that the effectiveness of a measure
requiring the addressee (a Member State in that particular case)
to behave in a certain way would be undermined if individuals
could not invoke the measure in the national courts.52 But
before applying the same logic to a Commission commitment
decision, it is worth recalling that Grad concerned a situation
where a Council decision addressed to Member States sought to
bring about harmonization in transport taxes across the Com-
munity but where Germany was seeking to apply conflicting na-
tional taxation laws.53 The obligation imposed on Germany
under the decision was the obligation not to apply such conflict-
ing laws after the prescribed date.54 The claimant's action was in
effect to protect the objectives, or the purpose, of the Council
decision by preventing Germany from applying conflicting na-
tional taxation laws.55
The integral nature of establishing the purpose of a Commu-
nity instrument in assessing whether it is capable of having direct
effect was further clarified and confirmed in the ECJ's judgment
in Antonio Mufioz y Cia SA v. Frumar Ltd.56 In this case, the refer-
ring national court asked the ECJ whether certain provisions of a
Community regulation, introducing inter alia a system of com-
50. See Grad, Case 9/70, [1970] E.C.R. 825, 837, 1 5, [1971] C.M.L.R. 1, 23.
51. TAros TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EC LAw 276 (1999). The princi-
ple of effectiveness has also been described as "the need to give full effect to a legislative
provision." Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, Commission v. Council, Case 242/87,
[1989] E.C.R. 1424, 1440, 1 26, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. 478, 485; see also Brasserie du
Pecheur v. Germany, Case C-46/93, [1996] E.C.R. 1-1029, 1-1159, 1 95, [1996] 1
C.M.L.R. 889, 996; Pfeiffer v. Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Waldshut eV, Joined
Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01, [2004] E.C.R. 1-8835, _I, 114, [2005] 1 C.M.L.R. 1123,
1179.
52. See Grad, [1970] E.C.R. at 837, 1 5, [1971] C.M.L.R. at 23.
53. See id. at 836, 839, 11 1, 11, 16, [1971] C.M.L.R. at 22, 25.
54. See id. at 839, 15, [1971] C.M.L.R. at 25.
55. See id. at 842, 2, [1971] C.M.L.R. at 27.
56. Antonio Mufioz y Cia SA v. Frumar Ltd., Case C-253/00, [2002] E.C.R. 1-7289,
1-7320-21, 1 27, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. 734, 758.
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mon quality standards for fruit and vegetables, were capable of
enforcement between individuals in civil proceedings. 57 This
clearly has resonance for enforcement of a commitment deci-
sion by an aggrieved third party.
The facts of this case are notable, especially if this judgment
is to be relied upon as support for the proposition that commit-
ment decisions can be privately enforced. It concerned a dis-
pute between a producer and a supplier of grapes in the United
Kingdom: Mufioz and Frumar.58 Mufioz claimed that Frumar
was incorrectly labelling the grapes it sold and consequently was
breaching its obligation under Regulation No. 2200/9651 to cor-
rectly label. 60 Prior to commencing legal proceedings, Mufioz
complained on several occasions to the Horticultural Marketing
Inspectorate ("HMI"),61 which had the role of ensuring compli-
ance with Regulation No. 2200/96.62 As a result of HMI's failure
to take up Mufioz's complaint, Mufioz brought legal proceed-
ings in the High Court in England to enforce the obligation on
Frumar under the regulation to correctly label the grapes it was
supplying.6 3
In ultimately holding that the provisions of the regulation
were capable of private enforcement, the ECJ first examined its
purpose, as indicated in the recitals to the regulation.6 4 It found
that this was to facilitate trade relations between the individuals
57. See id. at 1-7320, 24, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 758.
58. See id. at 1-7318, 17-18, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 757.
59. See Council Regulation No. 2200/96, O.J. L 297/1 (1996).
60. See Muioz, [2002] E.C.R. at 1-7318, 19, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 757.
61. See id. The Horticultural Marketing Inspectorate ("HMI") is part of the United
Kingdom Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Foods.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 1-7318, 20, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 757. The fact that the ECJ eventu-
ally had to rule upon whether Mufioz was entitled to privately enforce the terms of
Regulation No. 2200/96 indicates that the English courts were uncertain whether
Mufioz's claim was valid. In fact, at first instance, the English courts held that purpose
of the regulation in question was limited to ensuring that the grapes reached the mar-
ket in good condition and, therefore, precluded the possibility for Mufloz to privately
enforce them. See id. at 1-7319, 1 22, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 757. It was only at the domes-
tic appeal stage that the question of whether Regulation No. 2200/96 was capable of
being privately enforced was referred to the ECJ. See id. at 1-7319, 1 23, [2002] 3
C.M.L.R. at 757-58. Consequently, Mufloz's rights in this case were protected only be-
cause he was in a position to appeal and the national appellate courts were willing to
refer the question of the correct interpretation of the regulation to the Community
courts. In other instances, claimants may not have been as fortunate.
64. See id. at 1-7321, 1 29, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 758-59.
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based on fair competition.65 On this basis, the ECJ was able to
conclude that, in order to ensure the "full effectiveness" of the
rules in the regulation, it must be possible to enforce the obliga-
tions it contained by means of civil proceedings between individ-
uals.6 6
It appears, therefore, that establishing that an appropriate
purpose of commitment decisions would be undermined without
private enforcement will be crucial to the success of any private
enforcement action. At first sight, this issue would appear capa-
ble of easy resolution but, as we explain below, national courts
are likely to have to consider some interesting arguments, which
will undoubtedly be raised by defendants determined to avoid
private enforcement of their bilateral commitments "deal" with
the Commission.
1. Is the Purpose a Clear Application of Community
Competition Rules?
If commitment decisions were based on a finding of in-
fringement of either Article 81 and/or Article 82 of the EC
Treaty, their purpose would be clear: the protection of competi-
tion by the application of the prohibitions contained in those
provisions.67 Therefore, if commitment decisions clearly applied
Articles 81 and/or 82, there would be strong grounds to argue
that the proper effect of those articles would be undermined if
their implementation through the private enforcement of com-
mitments was not permissible.6"
65. See id.
66. See id. at 1-7321-22, 30, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 759. Advocate General Leendert
Geelhoed carried out a more exhaustive examination of the purpose of the regulation
and came to the same conclusion. See Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, Munoz,
[2002] E.C.R. at 1-7297-300, 1-7311, 9 27-36, 79, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 743-45, 755.
67. It is settled case law that the prohibitions in EC Treaty Articles 81 and 82 pro-
duce direct effects in relations between individuals and create direct rights in respect of
the individuals concerned that the national courts must safeguard. See Belgische Radio
en Televisie v. SV SABAM, Case 127/73, [1974] E.C.R. 51, 63, 22, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R.
238, 271.
68. See Muioz, [2002] E.C.R. at 1-7322, 31, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 759 (holding
that the possibility of bringing private proceedings strengthens the practical working of
Community rules on quality standards); see also van Gend & Loos, Case 26/62, [1963]
E.C.R. 1, 13, [1963] C.M.L.R. 105, 130-31 ("The vigilance of individuals concerned to
protect their rights amounts to an effective supervision in addition to the supervision
entrusted by Articles 169 and 170 to the diligence of the Commission and of the Mem-
ber States.").
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The potential problem here arises from the fundamental
nature of a commitment decision, as clearly spelled out in Regu-
lation 1, that there should be no finding of infringement.69 Re-
cital 13 of Regulation 1 states: "Commitment decisions should
find that there are no longer grounds for action by the Commis-
sion without concluding whether there has been or still is an
infringement."70 If there is no finding of infringement, then it
must follow that Articles 81 and 82 have not in fact been "ap-
plied" by the Commission.
Article 9, nevertheless, (understandably) comes close to sug-
gesting that commitment decisions apply EC Treaty Articles 81
and 82 by stating that they may only be adopted where the
"Commission intends to adopt a decision requiring that an in-
fringement be brought to an end,"'" thereby indicating that
there must at least be a prima facie case that there is a threat to
competition. This may be enough to persuade a national court
that the purpose of a commitment decision is to enforce EC
competition rules, even if technically Articles 81 and 82 have not
been applied. In a hotly contested case, however, this issue
would appear capable of giving rise to a reference to the ECJ
from the national court under EC Treaty Article 234.72
It may, therefore, be very important to the chances of suc-
cess before the national court that the Commission's commit-
ment decision spells out in considerable detail the competition
infringement that would have been found by the Commission
but for the offering of commitment.
The Commission's practice so far in this respect is not con-
sistent and leaves room for improvement.7" In Bundesliga, the
69. See Council Regulation 1/2003, recital 13, O.J. L 1/1, at 3 (2002).
70. Id.
71. Id. art. 9, § 1, at 9.
72. EC Treaty Article 234 enables national courts to request rulings on the inter-
pretation and validity of acts of Community institutions, including those by the Com-
mission. See Luigi Malferrari, The Functional Representation of the Individual's Interests Before
the EC courts: The Evolution of the Remedies System and the Pluralistic Deficit in the EC, 12 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 667, 669 (2005).
73. At the time of writing, the Commission had published only one decision under
the Article 9 procedure-in the Bundesliga case. See Commission Decision No. 2005/
396/EC, slip op. (Eur. Comm'n Jan. 19, 2005), cited in O.J. L 134/46 (2005)
(Bundesliga). We understand that there are at least four other Article 9 decisions in
contemplation: Coca-Cola, Repsol, De Beers/Alrosa, and BUMA/SABAM where the Com-
mission has, thus far, published only Article 27(4) notices and draft commitments. See
Commission Notice, Oj. C 200/11 at 12, 13 (2005) [hereinafter BUMA/SABAM]; see
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Article 9 decision reveals that it is, in fact, based on an assump-
tion-that the selling arrangements raised competition concerns
in the same markets that corresponded to those identified in the
Commission's investigation into the joint selling of commercial
rights of the UEFA Champions League.7 ' Furthermore, it pro-
vides little detail as to what the anticompetitive effects of the
agreements were on the proper functioning of competition.75
Indeed, the Commission does not appear wholly convinced of its
findings. 76 The Article 27(4) notice, which invites third party
comment, in Repsol provides a greater level of detail but again
falls short of indicating that there was a clear intention on the
Commission's part to adopt a decision finding that there was an
infringement. The Commission's concerns arose from certain
non-compete clauses in the notified agreements, which the
Commission found "might" contribute significantly to a foreclo-
sure effect. 77 No statement of objections was sent to the parties
in this case.78
In De Beers/Alrosa, although the Article 27(4) notice is very
short,79 the Commission comes close to indicating that it in-
tended to adopt a decision requiring the infringement to end."°
Not only does this notice disclose that the Commission sent sev-
eral statements of objections to the parties," but it also makes
clear the Commission's competition concerns.8 2 For example, it
states in relation to the notified agreements that they "would en-
hance the already existing market power of De Beers with the
effect of hindering the growth or maintenance of competi-
also Commission Notice, O.J. C 136/32, at 32, 2 (2005) [hereinafter De Beers/Al-
rosa]; Commission Notice, O.J. C 289/10, at 10, 2 (2004) [hereinafter Coca-Cola];
Commission Notice, OJ. C 258/7, at 11, 9 33 (2004) [hereinafter Repsol].
74. Compare Bundesliga, slip op. at 17 (2005), with Commission Decision No.
2003/778/EC, O.J. L 291/25, at 43-44, 91 114-16 (2003) (UEFA).
75. See Bundesliga, slip op. at 6-7, 91 21-24 (2005).
76. See, for example, paragraph twenty-three of the Bundesliga decision, where the
Commission says joint marketing "could have an adverse effect." Id. at 91 23.
77. See id. at 8-9, 91 15, 23-24.
78. Compare De Beers/Alrosa, O.J. C 136/32, at 32, 91 7 (2005) (stating specifically
that supplementary statements of objection were addressed to the parties), with Repsol,
OJ. C 258/7 (2004) (lacking any statements of objection).
79. See De Beers/Alrosa, OJ. C 136/32 (2005). This document was two pages in
total. The Commission's final decision is currently awaited.
80. See id. at 33, 91 12-16.
81. See id. at 32, 7.
82. See id. at 32, 9 9.
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tion." 3 In the next paragraph, it goes on to say that "competi-
tion on this market as a result of the Trade Agreement would be
substantially weakened." 4
The Article 27(4) notices in BUMA/SABAM s5 and Coca-
Cola 6 also appear to indicate that there were competition con-
cerns on the Commission's part. In BUMA/SABAM, the notice
states that the Commission sent a statement of objections to the
parties based on concerns of market division because the ar-
rangements under examination sought to grant the parties "ab-
solute exclusivity" by territory.8 7 In Coca-Cola, the notice states
(perhaps less emphatically) that, "all practices have made access
to the outlets more difficult for competitors to the ultimate det-
riment of consumers. 8 8
The purpose of the brief examination above is to illustrate
that the Commission's practice, thus far, tends towards merely
outlining the supposed competition concerns it was seeking to
remedy through the commitments it accepted.8 ' As explained, it
may help to get over the technical issue (that EC Treaty Articles
81 and 82 have not been applied) in the case of an attempted
private enforcement if the Commission were to ensure that its
commitment decisions clearly spell out that the purpose is to
remedy clear and present competition concerns, which other-
wise would have been dealt with by proceeding to an infringe-
ment decision, thereby making it easier for the national court to
establish clearly in its mind the competition purpose of the com-
mitment decision."0 That said, the national courts may well feel
83. Id.
84. Id. at 32, 10.
85. BUMA/SABAM, O.J. C 200/11 (2005). The Commission's final decision is
pending.
86. Coca-Cola, O.J. C 289/10 (2004).
87. BUMA/SABAM, OJ. C 200/11, at 11, 6 (2005).
88. Coca-Cola, O.J. C 289/10, at 10, 6 (2004).
89. See, e.g., Repsol, OJ. C 258/7, at 7-8, 5-12 (2004); De Beers/Alrosa, O.J. C
136/32, at 32, 4-5 (2005); BUMA/SABAM, O.J. C 200/11, at 11, J 6-7 (2005);
Coca-Cola, O.J. C 289/10, at 10, 1 4-6 (2004). It is worth noting, from the perspective
of undertakings, that the fact that the Commission provides only brief details on the
nature of its competition concerns under Article 9 may make the commitments proce-
dure extremely attractive. Not only will such a course avoid the negative publicity that
often comes with findings of infringement but it may also hinder follow on actions by
third parties for damages. There will consequently always be a tension between the
need for the Commission to set out clearly its reasons in the commitment decision and
the motivations of the undertakings under investigation.
90. It is possible that any difficulties in enforcement resulting from the Commis-
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that this issue should be referred to the ECJ under the EC Treaty
Article 234 reference procedure.
2. Is the Purpose Merely to Make Life Easier for
the Commission?
The Commission has identified another possible purpose for
a commitment decision-that of improving the Commission's
administrative efficiency.9 1 In a memo dated September 17,
2004, the Commission stated that it can consider commitment
decisions if and when: (a) "the companies under investigation
are willing to offer commitments which remove the Commis-
sion's initial competition concerns as expressed in a preliminary
assessment;" (b) "the case is not one where a fine would be ap-
propriate (this therefore excludes commitment decisions in
hardcore cartel cases);" and (c) "efficiency reasons justify that
the Commission limits itself to making the commitments bind-
ing, and does not issue a formal prohibition decision."92
The first and second points of this rationale are already pro-
vided for in Regulation 1.9 Article 9 itself provides that it is for
the companies under investigation to offer the commitments
and recital 13 of Regulation 1 stipulates that a commitment deci-
sion is not appropriate in cases where the Commission intends
to impose a fine.94 By a process of elimination, therefore, the
deciding factor in whether the Commission will exercise its dis-
cretion to adopt a commitment decision appears to be that of
administrative efficiency. 95
It will not come as a revelation that a key factor behind the
sion's summary description of its competition concerns would be remedied by coopera-
tion between national courts and the Commission, which could be effected under the
cooperation provisions (between national courts and the Commission) incorporated
into Regulation 1. See Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 15, O.J. L 1/1, at 12 (2002).
Article 15 (1) of Regulation I provides that a national court may ask the Commission to
transmit to it information in its possession on the application of Community competi-
tion rules. See id. art. 15(1), at 12. Alternatively, the Commission is entitled under Arti-
cle 15(3) to submit observations to a national court on its own initiative. See id. art.
15(3), at 12. Consequently, in cases of doubt, it may be possible for a national court to
satisfy itself, when enforcing a commitment decision, that it is giving effect to EC Treaty
Articles 81 or 82. See id. art. 15(1)-(3), at 12
91. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
92. Commission Memo, MEMO/04/217 (Sept. 17, 2004).
93. See Council Regulation 1/2003, O.J. L 1/1 at 3, 9 (2002).
94. See id.
95. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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decision to agree commitments will, inevitably, be the associated
time and costs savings on both sides. However meritorious these
savings may be, an argument can (and probably will) be made
that commitment decisions ought not to be directly effective if
their purpose is simply to save the Commission time and effort.
If this is the purpose, then it will already have been realized in
the savings achieved by the Commission in adopting a commit-
ment decision as opposed to an infringement decision. Bearing
in mind that Regulation 1 provides substantial enforcement pow-
ers to the Commission,9 6 there is no other purpose or objective
that would, therefore, be undermined by refusing to permit the
private enforcement of commitment decisions. This argument
may cause skeptical national judges to think twice before enforc-
ing a commitment decision.
Of course, it can be claimed that efficiency considerations
are legitimate. Modernization of the implementation of EC
Treaty Articles 81 and 82 through Regulation 1 has brought
about fundamental changes to the enforcement of competition
law by facilitating decentralization in enforcement and encour-
aging private enforcement.97 Both of these policies underpin
Regulation 1.98 As a result, the Commission hopes that its re-
sources will be freed to focus on the most serious infringements
of Community law, such as dealing with cross border cartels.99
Further, in Automec Srl v. Commission ("Automec If'), the CFI
recognized that the Commission should be entitled to deter-
mine its enforcement priorities given the extensive and general
nature of the task that it is entrusted with in the field of Commu-
nity competition law enforcement.100 There may, therefore, be
some merit in the proposition that the overall objectives of Reg-
ulation 1 may be undermined by requiring the Commission to
monitor and enforce every breach of a commitment decision.
There may be cases, for example, where the alleged breach is
confined to one Member State. In these circumstances, the
Commission may be legitimately entitled to claim that the
breach does not present sufficient Community interest to re-
96. See Council Regulation 1/2003, O.J. L 1/1, at 3 (2002).
97. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
98. See Council Regulation 1/2003, O.J. L 1/1, at 1 (2002).
99. See White Paper, supra note 1, COM (99) 101 Final, at 5, 8, 13.
100. See Automec Srl v. Commission (Automec I), Case T-24/90, [1992] E.C.R. II-
2223, 11-2274-75, 73-77, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 431, 477.
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quire the Commission to intervene.' 1 The Commission is
obliged, however, to carefully assess whether a complaint of a
breach of a commitment decision is such that it can be better
dealt with at the national level and consider the scope of the
remedies available in the Member State in question. 10 2 We con-
sider the issue of remedies below.
C. Does a Commitment Decision Create Rights in Favor of
Third Parties ?
The third stage of the direct effect analysis in the ECJ'sjudg-
ment in Grad was to ascertain whether the provision in question
created rights in favor of the individual seeking to rely on
them. 103
There is still a debate on the precise scope of direct effect in
this area. While the ECJ's jurisprudence in van Gend & Loos"°4
might be said to create the impression that a provision of Com-
munity law may be directly effective where it has the capacity to
be invoked before a national court (also known as "objective"
direct effect), its jurisprudence in other cases, such as Becker' 0 5
and Enichem,'°6 suggests that only those provisions of EC law that
confer rights on an individual may be enforced before a national
court (also known as "subjective" direct effect).107
101. See id. at 11-2277, 85, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at 479.
102. In Automec II, the CFI observed that a decision by the Commission to refer
complainants to their national courts instead of dealing with the complaint itself should
be based on the extent to which the national courts concerned can provide protection
to the complainant's rights under the relevant provisions of Community competition
law. See id. at 11-2278, 89, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at 480.
103. See Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein, Case 9/70, [1970] E.C.R. 825, 836, 2,
[1971] C.M.L.R. 1, 22.
104. Van Gend & Loos, Case 26/62, [1963] E.C.R. 1, [1963] C.M.L.R. 105.
105. Becker v. Finanzamt Mfinster-Innenstadt, Case 8/81, [1982] E.C.R. 53, 71,
25, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 499, 512-13. See also Alfons Lfitticke GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Sar-
relouis, Case 57/65, [1966] E.C.RI 205, 209-10, [1971] C.M.L.R. 674, 677-85 (comment-
ing on Article 90 (ex Article 95) of EEC Treaty in force at the time). The Court held
that the provisions of Article 90 (on internal taxation), which subjected Members States
to the obligation of non-discrimination, conferred on individuals the right to benefit
from it. Id.
106. Enichem Base v. Comune di Cinisello Balsamo, Case 380/87, [1989] E.C.R.
2491, 2506-07, 11, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. 313, 324-25.
107. See PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAw: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS
179-80 (3d ed. 2002); see also Walter van Gerven, Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures, 37
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 501 (2000); Sacha Prechal, Does Direct Effect Still Matter?, 37 COM-
MON MKT. L. REV. 1047 (2000).
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Although the debate about the precise definition of direct
effect may continue, the ECJ's judgment in BRT v. SABAM, s
which established that EC Treaty Articles 81 and 82 were directly
effective, refers only to the notion of the creation of rights.109 It
seems likely, therefore, that the narrower subjective notion of
direct effect will prevail for the purposes of Community competi-
tion rules. 110 Notably, in this regard, recital 7 of Regulation 1
contemplates only the protection of individuals' "subjective
rights" by a national court.1" The practical result may be to
render some of the obligations imposed on undertakings by a
commitment decision difficult to enforce by third parties, such
as competitors, who may not be able to show that the decision
was intended to confer any rights upon them. In Bulk Oil,1 12 for
example, the ECJ refused to allow an individual to attack the
export policy of the United Kingdom in the English courts on
the basis that the United Kingdom had failed to fulfill its obliga-
tion, imposed under a series of Council decisions, to notify
changes in its rules on exports to Member States and the Com-
mission. 13 In coming to this conclusion, the ECJ held that the
notification obligation on the United Kingdom concerned only
the "institutional relationship" between it, the Member States
and the Community, and, therefore, did not create individual
rights that national courts were obliged to protect. 4
The commitments accepted by the Commission in both the
108. BRT v. SABAM, Case 127/73, [1974] E.C.R. 51, 62, 16, [1974] C.M.L.R.
238, 271.
109. See id.
110. See, e.g., Courage Ltd. v. Crehan, Case C-453/99, [2001] E.C.R. 1-6297, 1-6322,
23, [2001] 5 C.M.L.R. 1058, 1078 (referring to EC Treaty Articles 81 and 82 as creat-
ing rights for individuals).
111. Regulation 1 does not provide a definition of what is meant by "subjective" in
this context, in particular, whether this is an indication of the nature of the rights that
will be directly effective. The ECJ's case law has also frequently referred to the concept
of "subjective rights" but has not yet defined what this means. Walter van Gerven pro-
vides an explanation based on the differences among European languages. He pro-
poses that "subjective rights" seeks to describe simply the rights available to a person
(the "subject") as recognized by the law and enforceable before a court of law. See Van
Gerven, supra note 107, at 501-36.
112. See Bulk Oil (Zug) AG v. Sun Int'l Ltd., Case 174/84, [1986] E.C.R. 559, 594,
61-62, [1986] C.M.L.R. 732, 766.
113. See id.
114. See id. The effect of this ruling was to prevent the claimant from relying on
the Community's rules on exports over national rules and thereby succeeding in a
claim for damages in separate litigation.
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Bundesliga"5 and De Beers/Alrosa1 6 cases illustrate the potential
difficulties that could be faced by third parties.
In Bundesliga, the Commission reached the preliminary as-
sessment that the exclusive selling of the commercial broadcast-
ing rights by the League Association prevented clubs from mar-
keting their rights independently and could, therefore, have an
adverse effect on the downstream television market and the mar-
ket in new media, where football content played an important
role in competition between program providers.1 17 In order to
address its competition concerns, the Commission accepted a se-
ries of detailed undertakings relating to the procedure and the
terms for the marketing of rights."1 Some of the key obligations
accepted by the League Association included: the selling of
rights by reference to key principles," 9 a three season cap on the
duration of contracts,120 allowing all qualifying third parties to
bid for the rights12' and bid for several rights packages at the
same time,1 2 2 and granting increased rights to clubs to exploit
rights to their games on a non-exclusive basis. 121
Clearly, some of these obligations purport to confer discern-
able rights on certain categories of third parties, such as the enti-
tlement to bid for media rights. 124 Arguably, therefore, a na-
tional court could enforce such an obligation (subject to its pro-
cedural rules) at the behest of an affected third party.125
Similarly, the provisions conferring increased freedom on indi-
vidual clubs forming the League Association to sell rights to
their games indicate that the third parties intended to benefit
from the provision, such as free-TV broadcasters, 126 mobile
phone networks 27 and free-to-air radio broadcasters. 28  The
115. See supra note 73.
116. See supra note 73.
117. See Commission Decision No. 2005/396/EC, slip op. at 23 (Eur. Comm'n
Jan. 19, 2005), cited in OJ. L 134/46 (2005) (Bundesliga).
118. See id. at slip op. I 41, 43.
119. See id. at annex, commitment 2.2.
120. See id. at annex, commitment 2.3.
121. See id. at annex, commitment 3.4.
122. See id. at annex, commitment 2.2.
123. See, e.g., id. at annex, commitments 2.4, 2.7, 5.1.
124. See id. at annex, commitment 3.6.
125. See, e.g., Courage, Case C-453/99, [2001] E.C.R. 1-6297, 1-6322, 23, [2001] 5
C.M.L.R. 1058, 1078.
126. See Bundesliga, at annex, commitment 5.1.
127. See id. at annex, commitment 5.3.
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ban on bundling,'29 which is the key prohibition on individual
clubs when selling their rights, makes no reference to such third
parties, however. 13 1 Other crucial provisions, such as the three-
season cap on contract duration,1 3 1 also express no conferral of
rights on third parties, nor do they identify the category of per-
sons that are intended to benefit.1 12
In De Beers/Alrosa, the Commission required similar commit-
ments from each of the companies.' At the time of writing,
these had only been published in draft.'3 4 The commitments
imposed include the obligation to: (a) cap the amount of rough
diamonds that the parties purchase from one another;' 35 (b)
take steps to ensure that the parties do not purchase (directly or
indirectly) diamonds originating from and sold by either party
to third parties;3 6 and (c) implement the commitment pursuant
to a trade agreement.1 7 In this case, there is no explicit men-
tion of third parties intended to benefit from rights created as a
result of the commitments.
Proponents of the direct effect of commitment decisions
(not least the Commission) may argue, however, that even if one
relies upon the narrower "subjective" concept of direct effect,
third parties will nevertheless be able to effectively enforce com-
mitment decisions before national courts.13 This is because the
128. See id. at annex, commitment 5.8.
129. See id. at annex, commitment 2.4.
130. See id.
131. See id. at annex, commitment 2.3.
132. See id.
133. See De Beers/Alrosa, O.J. C 136/32, at 32, 9 1 (2005).
134. See generally Commitments for Alarosa, De Beers/Alrosa Trade Agreement,
Case No. COMP/E-2/38.381 (Dec. 2004) [hereinafter Alarosa Commitments], available
at http://europa.eu.int/comm/compeition/antitrust/cases/decisions/38381/com-
mitmentsalrosaen.pdf; see also Commitments for De Beers, De Beers/Alrosa Trade
Agreement, Case No. COMP/E-2/38.381 (Dec. 2004) [hereinafter De Beers Commit-
ments], available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/deci-
sions/38381/commitments de.beeren.pdf.
135. See Alarosa Commitments, supra note 134, at commitment 2.1; see also De
Beers Commitments, supra note 134, at commitment 2.1.
136. See Alarosa Commitments, supra note 134, at commitment 3(b); see also De
Beers Commitments, supra note 134, at commitment 3(b).
137. See Alarosa Commitments, supra note 134, at commitment 4; see also De Beers
Commitments, supra note 134, at commitment 4.
138. Advocate General Karl Roemer's opinion in Grad provides some support for
this view, arguing that "there are side effects in favour of the citizens of the market
which, just like the corresponding provisions of the Treaty, must be directly guaranteed
by the national courts in the case of clear, unambiguous and unconditional directions."
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Commission's concern is to restore effective competition to the
market. The ECJ's judgment in Courage indicates that rights
arise not only where they are expressly granted, but also by virtue
of obligations imposed in a clearly defined manner on other in-
dividuals. 39 In this context, the concept of rights holders under
the decision should be considered to be a broad one, including
those individuals who have indirect or incidental rights con-
ferred upon them. On this basis, the draft commitments agreed
to in De Beers/Alrosa should be interpreted as intending to bene-
fit both competitors and customers, because the purpose of the
commitments appears to be to preserve the supply of diamonds
to the remainder of the market and constrain De Beers' market
power. Similarly, the "ban on bundling" on clubs in the
Bundesliga commitments14 ° can be viewed in this light as a mea-
sure seeking to grant third parties better access to rights by
prohibiting the sale of more than two games 141 to any one per-
son.
Although it may appear that the ECJ's judgment in Courage
in relation to EC Treaty Articles 81 and 82 is conclusive on this
particular issue, we believe that its application is more limited
than it may first appear. As these Treaty articles are themselves
of general application, it is correct to say that the obligation to
abide by them gives rise to a corresponding right for any third
party to have them privately enforced-general obligations give
rise to general rights. It may be stretching this logic too far, how-
ever, to say that each of the specific undertakings given by a
party only to the Commission gives rise to a corresponding right
for all third parties. Taken to the extreme, this logic would sug-
gest that De Beers and Alrosa's obligation to appoint a trustee to
Opinion of Advocate General Roemer, Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein, Case 9/70,
[1970] E.C.R. 825, 847, [1971] C.M.L.R. 1, 28. The Court's decision in Mufoz also
supports the view that a liberal approach must be taken to assessing whether the Com-
munity provision, which the individual is seeking to enforce-a regulation in that case-
confers the necessary rights on the individual to secure enforcement against a third
party. See Mufioz, Case C-253/00, [2002] E.C.R. 1-7289, 1-7297-99, 25, 26, 29, 30,
[2002] 3 C.M.L.R. 734, 758-59.
139. Courage, Case C-453/99, [2001] E.C.R 1-6297, 1-6321, 19, [2001] 5 C.M.L.R.
1058, 1077.
140. Commission Decision No. 2005/396/EC, slip op., annex, at commitment 2.4
(Eur. Comm'n Jan. 19, 2005), cited in O.J. L 134/46 (2005) (Bundesliga).
141. Four games may be sold in some circumstances.
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carry out the monitoring of commitments 14 2 also gives rise to
general rights.1 43 Logically, it would seem that only the Commis-
sion would have an interest in ensuring that the terms of the
trustee appointment, as set out in the commitments, were prop-
erly adhered to.
Therefore, in the circumstances, we believe that a national
court will need to determine on each occasion whether the par-
ticular claimant seeking enforcement benefits from the rights
under the commitment in question that he or she is claiming.
The outcome will in part depend on the national court's individ-
ual interpretation of the commitment. It is also possible that na-
tional courts from different Member States could come to differ-
ing conclusions as a result of their different traditions of inter-
pretation.
D. Are Commitments Unconditional and Sufficiently Precise?
The preceding discussion goes to the core question of
whether commitment decisions should be capable of direct ef-
fect. A separate and subsequent issue that a national court will
also have to deal with is to determine whether the exact terms of
the commitment are "unconditional and sufficiently precise. 144
142. SeeAlarosa Commitments, supra note 134, at commitment 6; see also De Beers
Commitments, supra note 134, at commitment 6.
143. The ECJ's judgment in Courage did not consider the effects arising from the
imposition of specific obligations under Community instruments, such as commitment
decisions, in the same way. See generally Courage, [2001] E.C.R. 1-6297, [2001] 5 C.M.L.R.
1058.
144. These conditions for direct effect were first formulated in van Gend & Loos as
clear, negative, unconditional, containing no reservation on the part of the Member
State, and not dependent on any national measure. See van Gend & Loos, Case 26/62,
[1963] E.C.R. 1, [1963] C.M.L.R. 105. The Community courts' application of these
criteria in subsequent cases has shown that they are not rigidly adhered to, especially
where it is clear that the instrument in question is "self-executing" and, therefore, capa-
ble of application by a national court. See, e.g., Becker v. Finanzamt Mfinster-Innenstadt,
Case 8/81, [1982] E.C.R. 53, 71, 1 25, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 499, 512-13 (referring only to
"unconditional and sufficiently precise" as the conditions for direct effect); Regina v.
Sec'y of State for Home Affairs, exparteSantillo, Case 131/79, [1980] E.C.R. 1585, 1600,
1 13, [1980] 2 C.M.L.R 308, 328 (stating in relation to a directive that "[t]hese provi-
sions, taken together, are sufficiently well defined and specific to enable them to be
relied upon by any person concerned and capable, as such, of being applied by any
court"); Hurd v.Jones, Case 44/84, [1986] E.C.R. 29, 83, 47, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 1, 46
(referring to the requirements of "clear and unconditional and not contingent on any
discretionary implementing measure"); Pfeiffer v. Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband
Waldshut eV, Joined Cases C-397/01 & C-403/01, [2004] E.C.R. 1-8835, _, 103,
[2005] 1 C.M.L.R. 1123, 1177-78 (referring to "unconditional and sufficiently precise").
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The Court's practice in determining whether these criteria
have been met has often been simply to declare, as if a matter of
fact, whether the provisions are unconditional and sufficiently
precise. 145 In Cava,'46 the ECJ took the opportunity to clarify in
greater detail what both of these conditions meant. In relation
to "unconditional," the Court stated "[a] Community provision
is unconditional where it is not subject, in its implementation or
effects, to the taking of any measure either by the institutions of
the Community or by the Member States."' 4 7 Accordingly, the
ECJ has held, for example, that EC Treaty Article 255 is not un-
conditional so as to be directly effective, because its implementa-
tion is dependent on the adoption of subsequent measures.' 48
In relation to "sufficiently precise," the ECJ stated in Cava
that "a provision is sufficiently precise to be relied on by an indi-
vidual and applied by the court where the obligation which it
imposes is set out in unequivocal terms.' 1 49 The ECJ concluded
in Cava that the provisions of the Community instrument in
question (a directive) were not sufficiently precise as they only
laid down an overall framework for the implementation of mea-
sures that the Member States were required to follow.' 5 °
Arguably, there is also a link between this last criteria and
the earlier discussion on whether a commitment decision con-
fers rights on an individual. The greater the precision of the
commitment decision, the clearer conferral of rights will be. It
may, therefore, be open for defendants in any enforcement ac-
tion to claim that the lack of clarity in the creation of rights also
harms a commitment decision's enforceability under these con-
ditions and vice versa.
It is likely that commitment decisions, especially having re-
gard to the commitments published thus far, will satisfy the re-
quirement of unconditionality. It is possible, however, that the
145. See, e.g., Pfeiffer, [2004] E.C.R. at._, 103, [2005] 1 C.M.L.R. at 1177-78.
146. Comitato di Coordinamento per la Difesa della Cava v. Regione Lombardia,
Case C-236/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-483.
147. Id. at 1-502, 9.
148. See Petrie v. Commission, Case T-191/99, [2001] E.C.RI 11-3677, [2002] 1
C.M.L.R. 519. EC Treaty Article 255 grants individuals rights of access to Community
documents in accordance with provisions laid down by the Council and the other Com-
munity institutions. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 29, art. 255, O.J. C 325/33,
at 135 (2002).
149. Cava, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-502, 10.
150. See id. at 1-503, 14.
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same may not be true for criterion of "sufficiently precise." It
will be for the Commission to ensure clarity and certainty by ex-
act and unambiguous drafting, which is, of course, in the Com-
mission's own interests to achieve.
III. CONCLUSION ON DIRECT EFFECT
The Commission's conclusion that its commitment deci-
sions can benefit from direct effect presupposes that its commit-
ment decisions have certain characteristics, something that is not
as clear as the Commission may wish. Whilst there are clear
points of principle to be resolved, much may ultimately depend
on the precise terms of the commitments themselves and the
interpretation of their purpose by the national courts. As we
have seen in Mufoz, where the national court was faced with a
similar task in relation to a Community regulation to the one the
Commission is expecting the national courts to carry out for its
commitment decisions, it was only as a result of a reference to
the ECJ by the national court (at the appeal stage) that the pur-
pose of the regulation was clarified, thus allowing for the protec-
tion of Mufioz's rights.15 1 The fact that the national court ini-
tially interpreted the purpose of the regulation as not giving rise
to rights of private enforcement may give the Commission an
indication of the difficulties that national courts will face when
dealing with an action seeking to enforce a commitment deci-
sion. The scores of references by national courts to the ECJ in
cases where direct effect of Community laws has been claimed is
testament to the fact that private actions to enforce commitment
decisions may be a lengthy and difficult exercise for courts and
litigants alike.
A. Can EC Treaty Article 10 Help?
In reviewing the issues surrounding the direct effect of com-
mitment decisions, it has occurred to the writers that a third
party may seek to "short-circuit" some of the difficulties identi-
fied above by looking at the obligations imposed directly on
Member States by the EC Treaty. Article 10 of the EC Treaty
provides:
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether
151. Mufioz, Case C-253/00, [2002] E.C.R. 1-7289, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. 734.
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general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations
arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the
institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the
achievement of the Community's tasks. They shall abstain
from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of
the objectives of this Treaty.1 5 2
In summarizing the case law of the Community courts, the
Commission's notice on cooperation with the national courts
provides:
[I]n its interpretation of Article 10 [of the EC Treaty], which
obliges the Member States to facilitate the achievement of the
Community's tasks, the Community courts found that this
Treaty provision imposes on the European institutions and
the Member States mutual duties of loyal co-operation with a
view to attaining the objectives of the EC Treaty. Article 10
EC thus implies that the Commission must assist national
courts when they apply Community law. Equally, national
courts may be obliged to assist the Commission in the fulfil-
ment of its tasks." 5'
As mentioned above, the Treaty specifically entrusts the
Commission with the task of ensuring the application of the pro-
visions of EC Treaty Articles 81 and 82,15' and subsequently con-
firms that, in carrying out its tasks, the Commission has the
power to take decisions.' Moreover, Regulation 1, which cre-
ates the Commission's power to adopt commitment decisions, is
the implementing legislation for Articles 81 and 82.156 It can be
argued, therefore, that national courts are obliged to assist the
Commission by enforcing commitment decisions pursuant to
their obligations under EC Treaty Article 10. In Roquette Frres,
the ECJ was asked to clarify the obligation of national courts to
assist the Commission in the enforcement of competition
152. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 29, art. 10, O.J. C 325/33, at 42 (2002).
153. Cooperation, supra note 6, O.J. C 101/54, at 56, 15 (2004). See also id. at 62
n.37 (2004) (referring to Zwartveld, Case C-2/88, [1990] E.C.R. 1-3365, 1-3372-73, 16-
22, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 457, 463-64; Delimitis v. Henninger Brau AG, Case C-234/89,
[1991] E.C.R. 1-935, 1-994, 53, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 210, 253); id. at 62 n.38 (referring to
Roquette Freres SA v. Directeur General de la Concurrence, Case C-94/00, [2002] E.C.R. I-
9011, 1-9054, 1 31, [2003] 4 C.M.L.R. 46, 79).
154. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 29, art. 85, O.J. C 325/33, at 66
(2002).
155. See id.
156. See id. art. 83, at 65-66.
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laws. 157 The case was brought by Roquette, who objected to an
authorization granted by French national courts to the French
government to assist the Commission in a competition infringe-
ment investigation by entering and searching the premises of
Roquette without first satisfying itself that there were indeed
grounds for suspecting the existence of anti-competitive prac-
tices.158 In finding that the French court was not entitled to
carry out a review of the nature claimed, the ECJ referred to the
obligation on national courts under EC Treaty Article 10 and
went on to state that:
In order to comply fully with that obligation and to assist, as it
must, in ensuring that the Commission's action is effective,
the competent national court is therefore required as rapidly
as possible to inform the Commission, or the national author-
ity ... of the difficulties encountered, where necessary by ask-
ing for the additional information needed.159
Article 10, therefore, appears to be a promising alternative route
for enforcement.
In light of the terms of Article 10,160 however, it is likely that
the successful application this article to the enforcement of com-
mitment decisions will depend upon the national court being
satisfied that the decision in question is intended to achieve the
objectives of the Treaty. In the field of competition, it is reason-
able to assume that this means assisting the Commission to apply
Community competition laws to ensure the protection of compe-
tition on the market.16' Whether commitment decisions are de-
signed to achieve the objectives of the Treaty and assist the Com-
mission as suggested will no doubt remind readers of the earlier
discussion of the purpose of commitment decisions. Conse-
quently, we believe that, although Article 10 potentially creates
one further possible mechanism to enforce commitment deci-
sions, the difficulties for national courts will remain essentially
the same as those identified under direct effect. National courts,
157. See Roquette Frres, [2002] E.C.R. at 1-9051, 21, [2003] 4 C.M.L.R. at 77.
158. Id. at 1-9049, 16, [2003] 4 C.M.L.R. at 76.
159. Id. at 1-9070, 92, [2003] 4 C.M.L.R. at 90.
160. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 29, art. 10, O.J. C 325/33, at 42 (2002).
161. See, e.g., Council Regulation 1/2003, at recital 9, O.J. L 1/1, at 2 (2002) (stat-
ing that the objective of EC Treaty Articles 81 and 82 is the protection of market com-
petition).
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therefore, may need to seek further guidance from the ECJ
under the EC Treaty Article 234 reference procedure.
B. Procedural Problems
Assuming the substantive issues described above can be
dealt with, a prospective third party enforcer of a commitment
decision will need to be satisfied that appropriate procedures
and remedies exist before the relevant national courts to justify
the time and expense of bringing enforcement proceedings. As
things currently stand, they are likely to be far from satisfied.
Community law provides that, in the absence of Community
rules, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to
institute such rules and procedure that ensure the effective pro-
tection of Community rights.' 6 2 The Community courts have
sought to achieve this by imposing two key obligations on na-
tional procedural rules: (a) national procedural rules must not
be less favorable for Community rights than those governing
similar domestic actions (the principle of equivalence); and (b)
national rules must not render it practically impossible or exces-
sively difficult to exercise rights conferred by Community law
(the principle of effectiveness). 6 '
In theory, these principles should mean that once a Com-
munity right has been established, the right to receive effective
protection is a foregone conclusion. The ECJ applied these
principles in Courage and established that national law must in
principle provide an action for damages against an individual for
breach of Community law.'6 4 Notwithstanding the ECJ's judg-
ment, then-Commissioner Mario Monti reported in 2004 that
the Directorate General ("DG") for Competition's study on pri-
vate enforcement of competition rules' 6 5 found that "not only
[was] there 'total underdevelopment' of actions for damages for
162. See Opinion of Advocate General Warner, Rewe-Zentralfinanz EG v. Landwirt-
schaftskammer fuer das Saarland, Case C-33/76, [1976] E.C.R. 1989, 1997, 5, [1977]
1 C.M.L.R. 533, 550; see also Comet BV v. Produktschap voor Siergewassen, Case C-45/
76, [1976] E.C.R. 2043, 2053, 12-16.
163. See Courage, Case C-453/99, [2001] E.C.R. 1-6297, 1-6324, 29, [2001] 5
C.M.L.R. 1058, 1079 (citing Palmisani v. Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale, Case C-
261/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-4025, 1-4046, 27).
164. See Courage, [2001] E.C.R. at 1-6323-24, 25-29, [2001] 5 C.M.L.R. at 1078-
79.
165. See DENIS WAELBROECK ET AL., ASHURST, STUDY ON THE CONDITIONS OF CLAIMS
FOR DAMAGES IN CASE OF INFRINGEMENT OF EC COMPETITION RULES 1 (Aug. 31, 2004),
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breach of EC competition law, but there [was] also 'astonishing
diversity' in the approaches taken by the Member States."1 6 6
Our own brief survey of national procedural rules in certain
Member States16 1 in the context of the possible enforcement of
commitment decisions confirms this finding. Although the na-
tional competition laws of the Member States are gradually be-
ing updated to bring them into line with Regulation 1, it appears
that no specific attention is being paid to ensuring the enforce-
ment of Commission commitments or other decisions under
Regulation 1.168
Unsurprisingly, the national procedural rules of the individ-
ual Member States all reveal different requirements for bringing
enforcement proceedings and correspondingly impose differing
burdens of proof on claimants. This will no doubt lead to a dis-
crepancy in the uniform enforcement of commitment decisions
in the European Union ("EU"). We give some illustrative exam-
ples below.
In France, we understand that an enforcement action would
have to be brought under the general regime for tort.1 69 Conse-
quently, in order to succeed, a claimant will have to prove fault,
damage, and a causal link between the two. It is worth noting
that whilst the requirement on the claimant to show fault
(breach of the commitment concerned) and damage (harm
caused to the claimant by the breach) is to be entirely expected,
the requirement to show a causal link between the two may harm
the prospects of successful enforcement, having regard to the
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions-for_
damages/comparative-report.cleanen.pdf.
166. Monti, supra note 3.
167. We have reviewed legislation in France, Germany, Italy, and the United King-
dom.
168. See, for example, Competition Act, 1998, c. 41 (Eng.), which is the key statute
for antitrust enforcement in the United Kingdom. This was updated in 2004-2005, fol-
lowing the adoption of Regulation 1. Although the reformed legislation provides for its
own domestic system to accept and enforce commitments in antitrust cases, it makes no
provision for the enforcement of the Commission's commitment decisions. The en-
forcement process in the United Kingdom will be a court-led process where the Office
of Fair Trading (the national competition authority) must apply to a court for an order
requiring compliance with commitments.
169. More specifically, the statutory basis for the action would be Article 1382 et
seq. of the French Civil Code, which states that any act of a person that causes damage
to another obliges that person to compensate the damaged party. See ConE CIVIL [C.
civ.] art. 1382 et seq. (Fr.).
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complex economic and factual assessments that inevitably need
to be undertaken in competition cases. There is a clear differ-
ence here between the simple enforcement mechanism given to
the Commission under Regulation 1 (the power to impose fines
for breach of the commitment without the need to show more)
and the criteria needed to satisfy a French judge. 170 Similar
problems arise in other Member States.
In the United Kingdom, the cause of action will also need to
be framed as breach of statutory duty. 17 ' The claimant must es-
tablish that the breach caused it loss and damage of the type the
commitment decision was designed to prevent.172 In proceed-
ings for an injunction (the most likely remedy sought), a claim-
ant must show why damages would not be an adequate rem-
edy.'17  Consequently, enforcement of a commitment decision
by requiring compliance with its terms pursuant to an injunc-
tion, whether interim or permanent, could be rare.
In Italy, it appears that claimants have two options available.
As an alternative to bringing an action in tort, we understand
that an action could potentially also be brought under competi-
tion laws. 174 An action under competition laws would, however,
be limited to claims between direct competitors. 175 It would also
be the first of its kind. In bringing an action under Italian com-
petition laws, the claimant will need to show the unfair conduct
on the part of the defendant, meaning that the defendant's con-
duct was contrary to principles of fairness (derived from general
commercial practice) and the conduct was capable of harming
the claimant.' 76 We understand that the impact of the second
limb of the test may be especially adverse for claimants with
strong market positions: the stronger the market position of the
claimant, the harder it will be to show that the conduct com-
170. See C. civ. art. 1382 et seq. (Fr.).
171. The statutory duty arises as a result of the incorporation of the Treaty into
English legislation via the European Communities Act, 1972, c. 62, § 2(2) (Eng.).
172. See generally European Commission, Study on the Conditions of Claims for
Damages in Case of Infringement of EC Competition Rules, National Report for United
Kingdom, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/ac-
tions-fordamages/national-reports/united-kingdom-enpdf.
173. See id.




plained of could harm them.1 7 7
In Germany, we understand that an action could currently
be brought under either the statutory tort law or the Act Against
Unfair Competition. The action under tort law would require
the claimant to show breach of the claimant's rights protected by
Community law, fault, damage, and causation. It is interesting to
note the standard of proof that claimants must meet. This is the
standard for civil proceedings, but claimants must satisfy the
court to a high level of "plausibility" or "practical certainty." The
alternative could be an action under the Act Against Unfair
Competition. As the issue of enforcement of a Commission deci-
sion by a third party has not yet arisen, however, the position is
somewhat uncertain. Germany has also recently introduced a
substantial package of reforms to its competition laws (the so-
called seventh amendment to competition law) ,178 which it is an-
ticipated will facilitate private enforcement. We understand,
however, that these reforms are primarily intended to enable
claims for damages for losses suffered as a result of breaches of
competition law. Therefore, they may not improve the position
of parties seeking to enforce a commitment decision.
Needless to say, this brief overview above is only the tip of
the iceberg. National rules will diverge on other issues that will
also be of concern to potential claimants, such as locus standi,
evidence, discovery, and remedies.
It will also be relevant that the principle established by the
ECJ's judgment in Courage179 may not provide sufficient support
for claimants seeking to establish their rights to a remedy for a
breach of a commitment decision. In this regard, a claimant will
no doubt seek an order as its remedy on final judgment so as to
prevent or deter the defendant from future breaches. 8 ° It will
also seek damages in compensation for loss sustained by breach
of the commitments for the period until the final judgment is
delivered, however. In these circumstances, we believe that the
lack of a finding of infringement by a commitment decision may
create some substantial hurdles for claimants.
We believe that a claimant will have two possible lines of
177. See id.
178. These entered into force on July 1, 2005.
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argument: either to show that that there was a breach of Article
81 and/or Article 82 of the EC Treaty as a result of a breach of
the commitment, or alternatively, argue that breaching a com-
mitment decision in itself gives rise to a claim for damages. It is
likely, however, that Courage will not support this latter argu-
ment, because its finding of a right to damages is based on an
underlying finding of breach of competition laws and not the
breach of a Commission decision.1 8' A claim for damages solely
for the breach of a commitment may therefore necessitate a new
reference to the ECJ under Article 234 of the EC Treaty.
CONCLUSION
There are many good policy reasons for allowing commit-
ment decisions to be enforced in national courts by third parties
such as customers or competitors. The Commission under-
stands this and has sought to encourage the concept as best it
can. It is clear, however, that the public statements of the Com-
mission on the subject 18 2 mask some significant legal complexi-
ties and practical pitfalls that any aspiring claimant would do
very well to surmount. In preparing this Article, the writers were
struck by a parallel with the difficulties faced (and time spent)
since the possibility of claiming damages for breaches of Articles
81 and 82 was first raised by the Commission in 1985.83 It took
some sixteen years until the ECJ's decision in Courage for the
principle to be finally established.18 4
Even if national courts can satisfactorily conclude that they
can enforce commitment decisions, there remains a question
over the potential effectiveness of Commission commitment de-
cisions if their enforcement is left primarily to third parties in
the national courts. Whilst the Commission will already be
seized of the facts and familiar with the underlying objectives of
its commitment decision in any given instance, a national court
may not share the same degree of appreciation. Furthermore, a
national court, whether of its own volition or due to limitations
imposed on it by its national procedural rules, may find itself
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constrained from granting what the Commission may have con-
sidered to be the most appropriate remedy in the circumstances,
such as interim measures. This may render the outcome and the
terms of any enforcement action unpredictable and unsatisfac-
tory.
The simplicity of the Commission's statements on private
enforcement belies a complicated and difficult proposition.
There remain some considerable challenges, given the current
development of Community law and the procedural difficulties
created by national laws, for third parties and the Commission to
be assured that commitment decisions will be enforced in na-
tional courts in the way that they were intended. These issues
will probably not be satisfactorily resolved without a preliminary
reference to the ECJ under Article 234 of the EC Treaty. Until
they are, as a matter of enforcement policy, we consider that the
most appropriate enforcer of commitment decisions is the Com-
mission itself, which retains the power under Regulation 1 to im-
pose substantial fines and periodic penalties to ensure compli-
ance with what are, after all, its own decisions.
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